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Abstract
In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result
of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals
that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result
of bargaining between CEOs and boards focuses attention on the power of
CEOs to increase their share of firm residuals in the form of increased
compensation, and the diligence of boards of directors to constrain CEO
opportunism. Framing this negotiation through a theory of justice offers an
alternative perspective to the search for pay-performance sensitivity. We
predict and find that as board diligence in controlling opportunism declines
and CEO power increases, CEOs are increasingly able to capture a larger
portion of firm residuals relative to shareholders. This finding supports critics
who charge that CEO pay violates norms of distributive and procedural
justice.

Keywords: CEO compensation, agency theory, board monitoring,
distributive justice

Following agency theory prescriptions for controlling agency
opportunism (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
corporate America increasingly adopted pay schemes that linked a
portion of agent compensation to outcomes important to principals.
For example, virtually 100% of CEOs’ pay today includes some form of
performance contingent pay. This widespread use of contingent pay
has provoked a large escalation in the use of equity forms of
compensation (particularly restricted stock and stock options) over the
past 25 years. The use of equity forms of compensation was thought
to tie executive pay more closely to shareholder wealth and led to
hundreds of studies attempting to measure this link, generally known
as pay-performance sensitivity (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).
Corresponding to the increased reliance on equity-based pay is
a greater increase in the amount of compensation awarded to senior
executives, especially CEOs. For example, average CEO compensation
rose as much as 614% in real dollars between 1980 and 2004
compared to a 7% rise in average worker pay over the same period
(Bogle, 2008). Others have also noted extraordinary rise in CEO
compensation in recent years, most of it due to increases in equity pay
(Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; Frydman & Saks, 2010; Walsh, 2008).
This rise in pay has not gone unnoticed by the media, who question
the size of CEO pay packages by noting the growing disparity between
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CEO pay and that of other segments of society (Deutsch, 2008;
Morgenson, 2013). While agency theory provides a strong foundation
for describing the challenges of controlling agent opportunism, its
normative views of agent opportunism has left us mired in an endless
debate of when or if opportunism is occurring, hindering our ability to
control it.
The focus on pay-performance sensitivity as a solution to agent
opportunism has brought forth a debate between defenders (Core &
Guay, 2010; Kaplan, 2008) and critics (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Walsh,
2008) of senior executive compensation practices. Critics charge that
CEO pay is excessive and continues to rise faster than GDP and
average worker wages, making it difficult to justify on economic
grounds (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; Frydman & Saks, 2010), and cite
the poor record of research into pay-performance sensitivity (e.g.,
Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Defenders argue that CEO
pay satisfies demands of market efficiency because it coincides with
changes in shareholder value (Core & Guay, 2010; Kaplan, 2008;
Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010) and reflects increases in
the contribution wage needed to compensate for increasing risk and
job complexity. Despite more than 1,200 articles published on the
subject (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010), the lack of
agreement on the appropriateness of CEO pay along with the absence
of consistent empirical support for its effectiveness in producing
shareholder value has led to a stalemate in the debate over executive
pay.
Writing from an economics perspective almost 30 years ago,
Eccles (1985: 52) drew from anecdotal evidence to conclude that “the
problem of fairness—never considered in the literature on agency
relationships—was frequently mentioned as an essential aspect of such
relationships.” An absence of rigorous treatment of this issue still
remains true today. This is surprising because, while not made explicit,
a concern for fairness underlies much of the controversy surrounding
CEO pay as reflected in such comments as “top executives are worth
every nickel they get” (Murphy, 1986: 125) and “the research
evidence to date strongly supports the conclusion that executives use
incentive compensation in ways that benefit themselves at the
expense of shareholders” (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007:
1028). Ironically a large literature on organizational justice has grown
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parallel to the agency literature, even though both literatures deal with
the allocation of rewards and the extent to which those rewards are
deserved. True to its origin and tradition, much of the CEO pay
literature continues to be embedded within an agency framework,
ignoring the insights of organizational justice scholars.
This study offers a novel interpretation of CEO pay from a
deservingness perspective by drawing on both agency and
organizational justice models. This combined theoretical lens enhances
our understanding of CEO pay by going beyond measuring how closely
changes in CEO pay correspond to changes in shareholder wealth to
considering the allocation of firm residuals between shareholders and
CEOs (i.e., whether the allocation conforms to normative views of
distributive justice) and the enabling conditions that may allow this to
occur (i.e., whether the allocation of residuals satisfies the normative
rules of procedural justice). This is an important issue at a societal
level because a sense of deep unfairness may give rise to widespread
cynicism about corporate governance if top ranks appear to benefit
from gaming the system (Loomis, 2009). Reflecting this view a few
years ago, President Obama referred to executive pay, particularly in
the financial industry, as “immoral.” From a more objective
perspective, both justice dimensions have been found to predict a wide
array of psychological constructs, such as satisfaction with leaders
(Tyler & Caine, 1981), acceptability of reward allocation decisions
(Lissak, 1983), motivation of subordinates (St. Onge, 1993), and
commitment to the firm (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Thus, normative
views of justice would seem important considerations in determining
the allocation of residuals between agents and principals.
In our view, debating the optimality of CEO pay misses a larger
and more significant concern over whether CEO pay violates normative
views of distributive justice. That is, does agent rent seeking result in
distortions to the allocation of firm residuals among firm stakeholders?
Empirically, prior research has largely focused on whether the
coefficient linking pay to firm performance in models of payperformance sensitivity is positive and significant, largely ignoring the
intercept that reflects the proportion of residuals captured by the CEO.
Thus, while annual fluctuations in CEO pay may have exhibited a
modest association with fluctuations in firm performance, the overall
size of CEO pay has risen relative to a variety of economic factors
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(e.g., inflation, GDP, and average wage scales). Recognizing this issue,
Kirkland and Burke (2006) quote a Forbes story on CEO pay: “What’s
at stake, in short, is nothing less than the public trust essential to a
thriving free-market economy.” Echoing this view, Walsh (2008: 30)
notes that “public concern about executive pay is not about the nature
of pay/performance sensitivities, nor is it about envy . . . [it] is about
fairness.” Given the outcry over CEO pay, it is important to determine
if CEO pay violates norms of distributive justice. Though Wirtz (2006:
23) laments that “you’ll find no such estimates in the literature,” we
suggest that examining the allocation of firm residuals between CEOs
as agents and shareholders as principals provides the estimate Wirtz is
seeking.
To address this shortcoming we focus on the question of
whether and under what conditions CEOs are able to capture more
returns than shareholders, who presumably have primacy rights to
firm residuals (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In particular, we suggest that CEOs are
able to extract greater returns than shareholders even after controlling
for reservation wages paid to CEOs. Furthermore, under certain
governance conditions, we find that agents are able to capture even
larger returns when measured against shareholder returns signaling
that CEO rent seeking is more aggressive when boards are less
effective. We offer a fresh new way of conceptualizing and measuring
CEO rent seeking which traditionally has been interpreted in terms of
agent pay-performance sensitivity. More specifically, we use a residual
analysis to ascertain the extent to which CEOs receive returns from
equity forms of pay beyond what can be explained by shareholder
returns. In essence, we compare the returns realized by CEOs to those
realized by shareholders, to determine if CEOs are capturing a larger
share of firm residuals relative to shareholders. We suggest that
allocations of firm residuals that favor CEOs over shareholders would
seem to violate normative views of distributive justice given that
classical agency writings and most financial economists posit the latter
as holding primary claimant rights to the firm’s residuals (e.g., Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Comparing CEO returns
to shareholder returns has implications for the distribution of firm
value among all stakeholders that several have suggested may
negatively impact the willingness of others to participate in the firm’s
value creation efforts (Kirkland & Burke, 2006; Walsh, 2008; Wirtz,
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2006). In sum, our approach is to break free of theories that fail to
provide justification for controlling agent opportunism and introduce a
justice perspective that compares CEO compensation relative to a key
constituent of the firm, its shareholders.
Full understanding of how CEOs may extract excess returns
requires that we also consider the context in which firm residuals are
allocated between shareholders and executives. Consistent with our
hybrid agency-justice theoretical perspective, we recognize conditions
that may exacerbate or constrain the ability of CEOs to capture larger
returns at the expense of shareholders. This hybrid perspective breaks
free from research that has focused largely on the CEO’s payperformance sensitivity. Thus, we recognize that boards of directors,
as shareholders’ representatives, play an important role in designing
and administering executive pay and ensuring against agent
opportunism. However, one finds a quagmire similar to that of the
pay-performance sensitivity research when it comes to examinations
of the effectiveness of boards of directors. While some scholars find
evidence that increased board monitoring garners positive stock
market reactions, higher bond ratings, and widespread support in the
financial community (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003), others find either no
effect (see the meta-analysis by Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson,
1998) or worse, a negative board impact on shareholders welfare
because through window dressing, impression management, and
symbolism decoupled from substantive actions, the appearance of
strong board monitoring can promote the self-serving agenda of
powerful CEOs (Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1994,
1998). The resulting confusion that emerges in this literature may be
due partly to a failure to fully appreciate the complex nature of
boards; while boards have traditionally been looked at through the
lens of structural independence, the idea of board diligence has
received less attention. Given that CEO pay is the result of a
negotiation between the CEO and the board, understanding how agent
opportunism is controlled or countenanced requires that we look more
closely at board diligence.
Essentially, we find that on average CEO returns exceed the
returns of shareholders who purportedly represent the firm’s primary
residual claimants (cf. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hansmann & Kraakman,
2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), strongly suggesting a lack of
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distributive justice in the allocation of residuals. While there might be
disagreement as to the optimal or even reasonable allocation of firm
residuals between principals and agents, one suspects that CEO
returns that consistently supersede shareholder returns over the
business cycle, even after controlling for the CEO’s reservation wages,
represent an agency cost, especially if CEOs simultaneously can
insulate themselves from risk.
This article contributes to existing research in several ways.
First, we link agency theory to organizational justice theory, creating a
powerful interdisciplinary model that can be used to study pay
deservingness at the top executive rank, a construct that is central to
the legitimacy of any incentive system. Second, we argue and find
support that CEO returns in excess of shareholder returns are partly
explained ironically by the use of performance-contingent pay intended
to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. That is, agency
prescriptions suggested for controlling CEO opportunism by tying a
portion of CEO pay to the performance of the firm’s stock (and thus
shareholder wealth) may be partly responsible for the breakdown in
alignment between CEO pay and firm performance resulting in a
violation of normative views of distributive justice. This contrasts with
the normative views underlying pay-performance sensitivity research
that views CEO pay as acceptable if it corresponds to fluctuations in
firm performance. Third, we outline the factors that facilitate or
constrain CEOs from capturing excess returns and that undermine the
control of agent rent seeking. In other words, we theorize on the
factors that tilt the balance of power between CEOs and shareholders
when contingent forms of pay such as stock options are supposed to
control agent opportunism. Thus, we enhance traditional approaches
to board monitoring by focusing on often overlooked dimensions that
are critical for constraining agent opportunism, and which raise issues
of procedural justice in how firm residuals are allocated through the
negotiation of CEO pay. Finally, we take a different approach to
studying the control of agent opportunism by proposing an innovative
method of examining the relative distribution of firm residuals between
CEOs and shareholders.
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Theory and Hypotheses
Among publically traded firms where ownership is separated
from control, CEOs are hired to formulate and implement strategies
that will generate profits and earn positive rents for shareholders. To
overcome CEO shirking and motivate CEOs to be diligent guardians of
shareholder wealth, principals purportedly design compensation
contracts where a sizeable part of CEO pay is linked to firm
performance. In theory this is intended to create alignment in the
interests of CEOs and shareholders over the creation of shareholder
value. Embedded in prescriptions for creating incentive alignment is
the shared belief that maximizing shareholder value by limiting agent
rent seeking is the principal goal of corporate governance (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). In practice, empirical evidence of this alignment is
scant (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Tosi et al., 2000). Empirical
examinations of pay-performance sensitivity find at best weak and
often inconsistent associations between CEO pay and firm
performance. Thus, while increased use of equity-based pay would
seem to ensure a link between CEO incentives and shareholder value
creation, such a link has yet to materialize in any consistent way.
Meanwhile, CEO pay has risen, resulting in an ever larger share of firm
residuals.
Reliance on so-called incentive alignment mechanisms for
controlling agent opportunism has resulted in an exponential rise in
total CEO compensation driven by use of equity forms of
compensation. This increase in CEO pay comes in stark contrast to
lesser growth exhibited by the economy, the average wages of
employees and inflation in general (e.g., Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005;
Bogle, 2008; Deutsch, 2008; Frydman & Saks, 2010; Morgenson,
2013; Walsh, 2008). That is, during the pursuit of a stronger
association between pay and performance, CEOs have somehow
captured an increasing share of firm residuals that is difficult to justify
as optimal given that CEO pay remains largely insensitive to
fluctuations in firm performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). The growing
disparity between the increases in CEO pay and that of other segments
of the economy raises issues about the roots of social inequality, in
particular whether CEOs are receiving more than their fair share of
firm residuals and what has allowed this to occur. Indeed, it would be
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difficult to justify on normative grounds having agents who are already
highly paid to have greater access to residuals than investors who risk
their capital in the firm and whom most agency scholars would agree
represent the primary claimants to returns on their investment. All of
these concerns are reflective of socially constructed norms regarding
distributive justice between investors and executives of public
companies.
To understand how CEO pay has risen, we must consider the
process by which CEO pay is determined. To do this we view CEO pay
as the outcome of a bargaining process between the CEO and the
board of directors. Thus, outcomes of this process are likely influenced
by the ability and power of the CEO vis-à-vis representatives of the
shareholders (i.e., board of directors) to extract value from the firm in
the form of additional compensation. In other words, CEO
compensation and rewards are the outcome of a bargaining process
between the CEO and the board where the former would prefer more
pay over less and less risk over more risk, while the latter would prefer
to pay less and transfer some risk onto the agent. Typically the
compromise between these opposing preferences has led to greater
reliance on equity forms of pay and correspondingly an escalation in
the overall amount paid to CEOs (e.g., Bebchuk, & Grinstein, 2005).
Alternatively, if the CEO is not able to or does not know how to secure
extra value for herself or himself, it is less likely that principals and the
board of directors in particular will voluntarily award larger payments,
which directly affect their own firm wealth (e.g., Williamson, 1985).
This leads us to ask when and under what conditions either the CEO is
able to extract greater amounts of wealth or the principals can
constrain CEO rent seeking and limit the portion of firm residuals
captured by the CEO. Viewing the relationship between CEOs and the
board of directors (representing shareholders) as a battle over firm’s
residuals (Williamson, 1985), we argue that two broad categories of
factors—CEO structural power and governance structures—would
make the CEO or the board more powerful and able to extract larger or
smaller shares of firm residuals.
Viewing CEO pay as the result of a bargaining process between
parties who vary in their ability and power to influence the outcome
focuses attention on the nature of this process and whether failures in
procedural justice may help explain departures from distributive
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justice. Specifically, procedural justice is a necessary precondition for
distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990); hence examining factors that
influence the process of allocating firm residuals among stakeholders,
especially allocations to the CEO in the form of compensation, may
help us better understand how violations of distributive justice might
occur. Thus, we begin by examining for evidence of distributive justice
failure by comparing CEO returns to those of shareholders, while also
considering how factors influencing this process may violate issues of
procedural justice.

Distributive Justice Failure
Distributive justice reflects the allocation of resources among
members of a society and whether that allocation corresponds to
socially shared beliefs about how those resources should be allocated.
Different societies may hold different beliefs about what constitutes
distributive justice. For example, some societies may accept a creed in
which resources are allocated to people based on need, and from
people based on ability (Marx, 1906), while others may favor a model
of distribution based solely on merit (Smith, 1937). Within a capitalist
system, owners of valuable assets (such as investors in a corporation)
are traditionally given primary claimant rights to the residual value
produced by those assets (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Specifically,
societies that view distributive justice through the lens of capitalism
acknowledge that in exchange for their willingness to accept the risk
that their investment may or may not provide a positive return,
owners are granted primary claimant rights to firm residuals. This
should be reflected in the returns they realize from their investment.
This arrangement has positive benefits for society by encouraging
investment in entrepreneurial ventures and thus the creation of new
value that is ultimately distributed among all stakeholders.
The tremendous success of this system has led to the separation
of ownership from control due to a need to pool resources from
multiple investors to continue developing and expanding valueproducing assets. Thus, dispersed owners hire agents to manage their
investment making owners vulnerable to agent opportunism (Berle &
Means, 1932). Though various mechanisms are employed to control
agent opportunism, both empirical research and conventional wisdom
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suggest that agents may be winning the battle with shareholders over
the allocation of firm value. If true, this suggests a breakdown in the
normative views of distributive justice regarding the socially accepted
norm for allocating firm residual value between owners and agents.
Specifically, if agents are capturing a larger portion of firm value than
shareholders, even after compensating CEOs for their human capital
investment (i.e., their reservation wages), this would appear prima
facie evidence that traditional notions of resource allocation between
agents and principals are being violated. Said formally,
Hypothesis 1: The use of equity-based pay in CEO compensation results in
CEOs realizing higher returns from equity than shareholders thus
violating norms of distributive justice in the allocation of firm residuals
between agents and principals.

Procedural Justice Failure
Procedural justice concerns the fairness in allocation processes
(Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker,
1975). This literature identifies six rules that are associated with the
perceived fairness of allocation processes: consistency, bias
suppression (including both the transparency and impartiality of the
process), objectivity, diligence in addressing issues and taking
corrective action if necessary, representation of the affected parties,
and compliance with culturally accepted norms of fairness. These rules
have been empirically demonstrated to influence perceptions of the
fairness of allocation decisions and ultimately individual behavior,
including the behavior of those not directly affected by the allocation
process (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). In the context
of principal–agent relations, we contend that justice is served if the
procedure for allocating firm residuals is consistent across agents and
time, if no individual party is favored over others, if the allocation is
based on accurate information and informed opinion, if there is due
diligence among those responsible to make the allocation, if all
stakeholders affected by the allocation are represented, and if cultural
norms of fairness and equity are followed.
A large literature indicates that when managers are in control of
the firm they tend to pursue compensation policies that benefit them
at the expense of atomistic owners (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; see also

Journal of Management, (June 4, 2014). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications.

11

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Tosi et al., 1999, for review), and it is possible for powerful CEOs to
take advantage of other principals due to their central position in
allocating firm wealth among the various stakeholders. The potential
for CEOs to leverage their position to capture a larger share of
residuals would seem to violate the rule of bias suppression in
procedural justice. As noted earlier, if CEO returns are in excess of
shareholder returns, this would seem to be evidence of bias favoring
the CEO in the allocation of firm residuals. Given that CEOs are already
well paid for their human capital through a variety of perquisite and
nonperquisite rewards, this bias would be difficult to justify from a
normative perspective.
An important discretionary factor likely to facilitate or hinder
CEO’s accrual of excess returns is this individual’s structural power
within the firm. Research by Hambrick and Cannella (2004) and
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), among others, suggests that as the
structural position of the CEO within the firm increases his or her
influence over organizational decisions strengthens accordingly. While
it is true that even powerful CEOs operate within the constraints of
preexisting governance structures, they may enjoy disproportionate
influence to tilt the balance in their favor when it comes to a sharing of
firm residuals. Consistent with a social stratification view (Pfeffer,
1981), we hypothesize that an important predictor of CEO relative
returns is the power that resides in the top executive suite.
Research on employee compensation and negotiation is clear
that agents have their strongest bargaining power in negotiating their
employment agreement at the time of their initial appointment when
they enjoy greater freedom to walk away. For example, evidence
suggests that outside CEO hires earn approximately 13% to 15.3%
more than internal hires (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Murphy & Zabojnik,
2004). Those being hired into the CEO position are most likely to take
advantage of this situation for several reasons. First, new CEOs can
take advantage of small numbers bargaining in which negotiation is
restricted to a single partner. This is because boards generally
negotiate with candidates sequentially, such that they negotiate with
their preferred candidate and only when they cannot reach a mutually
agreeable contract will they open negotiations with a second
candidate. This approach clearly puts the candidate in a stronger
position when negotiating compensation, and this stance would be
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exaggerated further if she or he is currently employed elsewhere.
Second, boards are likely to hold optimistic views about the potential
contributions of a new CEO based on the candidate’s prior success.
This optimism may inflate the value they initially attribute to the CEO’s
human capital, thus justifying concessions to the CEO’s demands.
Finally, both parties are generally represented by outside council or by
consulting firms specializing in executive compensation. These
representatives have access to compensation data from other firms
that are used in supporting their demands. If boards have a strong
interest in hiring the candidate, they are likely to concede to demands
supported by data provided by the candidate’s representative.
In sum, the negotiation of CEO compensation and thus the
allocation of firm residuals between the CEO and shareholders appear
to violate several features of procedural justice and may offer some
explanation for violations of distributive justice in which shareholders
take a backseat to CEOs. In the next section we suggest that
bargaining between CEOs and the board of directors over the
allocation of firm residuals is likely to change over time due to changes
in the CEO’s structural power and the nature of governance structure
employed to control agent opportunism.

CEO Structural Power
A long string of research has brought onto center stage the
internal struggle among corporate actors who often scramble to
pursue pluralistic goals even if this comes at the expense of other
stakeholders (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Westphal & Graebner, 2010). The bargaining between an executive as
agent and those representing the principal over allocation of firm
residuals represents one such struggle (Coffee, 1988; Williamson,
1985). Drawing on prior research, we outline two indicators of CEO
structural power—CEO tenure and CEO duality.

The dual nature of tenure in CEO structural power
Prior research on CEO tenure offers inconclusive findings
whether tenure garners higher or lower power to CEOs. In particular,
while the literature on human capital and CEO obsolescence argues
that longer tenure is associated with lower CEO power, the literature
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on CEO entrenchment posits that longer-tenure CEOs enjoy greater
power inside the firm. We suggest the reason for the lack in consistent
findings is that two opposing factors affect the CEO’s power as CEO
tenure increases: the decaying of the CEO’s human capital and their
growing entrenchment in the position of CEO. The former corresponds
to a weakening of power, while the latter enhances CEO power.
As noted above, CEOs are likely to have very high relative
bargaining power when initially hired. Barring continued success, the
power of the CEO to act unilaterally may decline over time due to
obsolescence. The CEO’s human capital may not fit with the firm or
become stale and its quality deteriorate with a changing environment,
leading to the choice of strategies that lack fit with the environment
(Miller, 1991) and harm performance (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick,
2006). In addition, the longer CEOs remain with a firm the more firmspecific capital they will develop, which may have limited value to
other firms. That is, long-tenured CEOs not only offer a smaller
contribution to the firm’s success, but also have fewer employment
alternatives given that their human capital increasingly lacks market
value. From a bargaining perspective (e.g., Kim & Fragale, 2005;
Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), the smaller the CEO’s contribution
and the fewer alternative employment opportunities available due to
their diminishing human capital, the lower the CEO’s power vis-à-vis
the board. As a result, as tenure increases, CEO power declines due to
increased obsolescence leading to lower CEO relative returns from the
firm.
The literature on CEO entrenchment argues for an opposite
impact of CEO tenure. The longer CEOs stay in office, the more power
they are able to garner (e.g., Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Hill & Phan,
1991). In particular, CEOs may increase their influence in the firm
over time through a variety of tactics including ingratiating themselves
with key constituents, manipulating and selecting board members, or
establishing a strong record of performance (e.g., Mace, 1971;
Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). These contributors to CEO
power, often summarized as factors underlying CEO entrenchment,
have been associated with increased opportunism (e.g., Combs & Skill,
2003; Ocasio, 1994). Thus, over time CEOs could increase their power
vis-à-vis the board and be able to request and receive larger shares of
firm residuals.
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We believe that these opposing perspectives combine to
influence the power of CEOs over time. However, we posit that CEO
obsolescence is more likely to affect CEO power early in the CEO’s
tenure, while entrenchment is likely to counterbalance that effect later
in the CEO’s tenure, resulting in a nonlinear association between
power and CEO relative returns. This occurs because entrenchment
effects require time to develop, while human capital may begin to
decay early with changes in environmental conditions, performance
consequences that fail to satisfy early expectations, or simply limits to
the CEO’s ability to contribute. Thus, we would expect tenure will
exhibit a negative association with CEO relative returns, but this
association will shift toward a positive association in later years as the
CEO’s deepening entrenchment reverses her or his declining power.
Thus, we propose a convex relationship between CEO tenure and CEO
relative returns where the latter will decrease at a diminishing rate
with increases in CEO tenure:
Hypothesis 2: CEO tenure exhibits a U-shaped association with CEO relative
returns such that CEO returns relative to shareholder returns decrease
initially over time, but later rise due to increasing entrenchment.

CEO duality as a violation of procedural justice
Another indicator of CEO structural power and thus a threat to
bias suppression in the allocation process is when a CEO also occupies
the position of board chairman. In general, duality renders more power
to the CEOs and weakens the ability of the board to challenge and
oversee the CEO (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). A CEO who also
presides over the board of directors has enormous power over
directors and could influence the agenda, deliberations, and decisions
in the boardroom (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). As a result, not only
can a CEO chair filter information to the board, but also she or he
could represent excess CEO returns as appropriate and justified. Prior
research also suggests that “CEOs who serve as board chairs gain
influence over board member nominations, compensation setting,
board agendas, and so forth, even if they do not formally serve on the
committees charged with those responsibilities” (O’Connor, Priem,
Coombs, & Gilley, 2006: 487), which ultimately undermines board
monitoring (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, &
Bierman, 2010) and reduces the ability and motivation of directors to
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constrain the CEO rent seeking. Overall, the existence of duality
should allow CEOs to more easily capture a larger portion of firm
residuals, and violates a rule of procedural justice, notably the
requirement of impartiality as reflected in suppression. Thus,
Hypothesis 3: CEO duality exhibits a positive association with CEO relative
returns compared to shareholder returns.

Governance Structures
Boards of directors play a key role in determining CEO compensation,
given their formal authority to negotiate with CEOs over distribution of
the firm’s joint outputs (e.g., Williamson, 1985). That is, boards
negotiate with CEOs over pay amount and pay design, such as the
amount of pay linked to achievement of firm outcomes important to
shareholders. Linking pay to firm performance is thought to increase
incentive alignment between agents and principals (see Murphy, 1999,
for a survey of CEO compensation and agency contracting) and is
argued to be a desirable mechanism for protection of shareholder
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Assuming that agent selfinterests are likely to diverge from those of shareholders (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), it then follows that the preferences of the two
negotiating parties diverge. The resulting balance among these
competing interests is likely to be a function of the effort each side
puts into negotiating on their own behalf. Though CEOs clearly are
motivated to bargain for more pay and less risk since they benefit
directly from winning in these negotiations, it is less clear how much
incentive boards have in tempering CEO desires.

Board Diligence
Agency theorists have long argued that the board should be
independent if it is to diligently perform its monitoring and reward
functions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). From a procedural perspective this
should result in an allocation of residuals that reflects normative views
of distributive justice. Furthermore, there is a strong tradition
emanating from the human resource management literature that there
should be some emotional distance and lack of vested interests
between those who judge and those being judged (Eccles, 1985). This
view rests on arguments that the appraisal of individual merit and
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judgment of pay deservingness demand some reasonable degree of
objectivity in the assessment process even though validity and
reliability of evaluation results will never be perfect (e.g., Milkovich,
Newman, & Gerhart, 2013).
Building on this view there has been considerable though largely
unsuccessful effort at empirically linking board independence as
reflected in the proportion of outside directors to the control of agency
costs (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Dalton et al.,
1998). A primary reason for the failure of board independence to
demonstrate a strong role in controlling agency costs is suggested by
the sociopolitical perspective of corporate governance, which highlights
how top executives seek to manage the impressions of external
constituents about governance structures, policies, and procedures
(Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). According
to this view, self-serving CEOs can enhance the legitimacy of high
compensation packages with limited risk by demonstrating conformity
to the prevailing ideologies or institutional forces by symbolically
appointing more outside directors to the full board who share strong
social ties with them. External constituents, the media, and
governance scholars, observing formally independent boards with a
high level of structural legitimacy, may erroneously assume that such
a board will also have higher process legitimacy to effectively control
managerial self-interest (Suchman, 1995). In the words of Westphal
and Graebner (2010: 16) “powerful leaders can give the impression of
enhancing the board’s control capacity, without actually increasing its
propensity to exercise control, by making changes in board
composition that increase the board’s formal independence from
management without increasing (or even decreasing) its social
independence.” Thus, board independence has generally failed to
reflect the underlying motivations of board members in controlling CEO
opportunism. In other words, from a procedural justice perspective
stacking a board of directors with members who exhibit economic
independence but who share strong social ties to the CEO raises
questions about the ability of the board to adequately represent the
interests of shareholders.
To capture the board’s incentive to control agency costs when
bargaining over firm residuals with the CEO, we propose to examine
board diligence defined as the degree of director motivation and ability
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in fulfilling board responsibilities. Focusing on board diligence avoids
equating structural characteristics of the board, such as economic
independence, with the board’s motivation as has been done in some
prior research where the concept of vigilance has been subsumed
within board independence (e.g., Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008).
Thus, we suggest that from a procedural perspective board diligence
represents a crucial factor in assessing the degree to which boards
make a fair allocation of firm residuals and thus avoid situations where
CEO returns exceed those of shareholders. Assuming boards are
charged with representing the interests of shareholders when
negotiating the CEO’s pay package, linking board diligence to CEO
relative returns should indicate the degree to which interests of
shareholders are adequately represented in this allocation decision.
From an agency theoretic perspective board diligence is
associated with the motivation of board members to control agency
costs and their motivation is likely strong with the amount of equity
they own in the firm. As a result, they are less likely to bequeath a
larger share of residuals to the CEO since these residuals would come
at their expense due to the fact of directors being partial owners in the
firm. That is, board equity makes the board a residual claimant and
thus engenders greater motivation on the part of directors as
principals to prevent CEOs from obtaining a larger share than they
receive (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). Alternatively,
director equity ownership encourages the board to be more diligent in
its fiduciary duties and to stay more cautious toward the CEO’s
outwardly aggressive or obvious rent-seeking behavior. In other
words, when the board is properly motivated to represent shareholder
interests, we would expect that CEO opportunism in the form of CEO
relative returns is more likely constrained.
In addition, board diligence is also related to the ability of
directors to constrain CEO opportunism. Such ability likely depends on
the level of director attendance at board meetings. Regular attendance
at board meetings should provide directors with detailed information
on the CEO’s intentions and efforts as well as offering them more
thorough knowledge for accurately evaluating the CEO, conducting
proper monitoring, and fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the firm. If
directors miss many board meetings, the CEO is more likely to take
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advantage of their absence to extract larger returns. This logic leads to
our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Board member diligence exhibits a negative association with
CEO relative returns compared to shareholder returns.

Method
Sample and Data
Data for this study were drawn from several sources: financial
data from Compustat, executive compensation data from Execucomp,
and board-level data from Bloomberg, Risk Metrics, and Corporate
Library’s Historical Data. Our data were collected for the years 2001
through 2008. This resulted in a final sample size of 2,864 individual
CEO-year observations for testing our hypothesized relationships.

Dependent Variable
CEO relative returns
We define CEO relative returns as returns on CEO equity-based
compensation relative to shareholder returns. CEO returns in excess of
shareholder returns after controlling for other forms of CEO pay would
seem to represent a failure of normative views of distributive justice in
which shareholders presumably are the primary claimants of firm
residuals (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Analogous to the
shareholder wealth maximization goal of incentive alignment, we
compare CEO returns to shareholder returns as proxy for assessing the
allocation of firm residuals between agents and principals. To create
our measure of CEO relative returns, we first measured the annual
change in CEO wealth resulting from contingent pay (producing CEO
returns) and regressed this measure on annual shareholder returns
controlling for CEO turnover, firm size, firm performance, and firm
risk. A full description of how this measure was calculated can be
found in the appendix. The latter variables control for human capital
and personal risk factors that are not shared by shareholders (see
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). This regression model is used to test
Hypothesis 1. In essence, this approach allows us to directly compare
the annual returns accrued by CEOs on their equity holdings (including
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changes in the intrinsic value of stock options) to the returns that
shareholders receive on their equity holdings (including dividends). In
general, a regression coefficient on shareholder returns larger than 1
would indicate that CEOs are capturing a larger share of firm residuals
than shareholders. Results from this procedure are presented in Table
2.
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We use the residuals from the model above as our DV in testing
Hypotheses 2 to 4.1 Essentially, our DV (CEO relative returns)
represents the amount of unexplained movement in CEO returns
relative to shareholder returns and firm performance. Similar approach
has been utilized in prior research focusing on whether CEOs receive
appropriate pay and whether their pay reflects objective economic and
organizational conditions (e.g., Fong, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2010; Wade,
O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006). Our approach is methodologically preferable
to creating a difference variable that subtracts shareholder returns
from CEO returns. Difference variables have been criticized for
producing problems of interpretation as well as potentially biasing
associations (Edwards, 1996; Wiseman, 2009). Furthermore, we avoid
using a ratio of CEO returns to shareholder returns (cf. Nyberg et al.,
2010) because our purpose is to examine whether and why CEOs
extract a greater share of residuals than shareholders; a regression
approach allows us to appropriately capture the core construct of CEO
relative returns.

Independent Variables
CEO tenure (Hypothesis 2) reflects the relative structural power
of the CEO in the company. CEO tenure is measured as the number of
years the CEO has been in office (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006).
CEO duality (Hypothesis 3) is measured as 1 if the CEO and
board chairman positions are held by the same person and 0 otherwise
(Boyd, 1995).2
Board diligence (Hypothesis 4) is represented by board
incentives and board attendance. Board incentives is calculated as the
proportion of equity-based pay to total director pay received by board
members (Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011). Board attendance is
calculated first as the number of directors who have missed at least
75% of annual meetings (Risk Metrics, 2013). This variable is then
reverse coded so that, like with board incentives, higher values
correspond to higher levels of diligence.
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Control Variables
We control for several factors that provide additional indicators
of governance control over agency costs including institutional
ownership, board independence, board size, and board meetings.
Institutional ownership is modeled as a dummy variable that is coded
1 if there exists at least one owner with a large ownership position,
and 0 if not. Prior research argues that institutional investors are “a
store of potential influence” (Pfeffer, 1981: 52) and serve to align the
interests of agents and principals (Dalton et al., 2003). Board
independence is the percentage of board members who are classified
as neither “inside” nor “related outside,” where related outside is
defined as board members with economic ties to the firm (e.g.,
bankers, suppliers) outside of their position on the board of directors
(Dalton et al., 1998). The correlation between board incentives and full
board independence is –.002, and the correlation between board
attendance and full board independence is .01, indicating that these
dimensions are distinct from one another (see correlation matrix,
Table 3). Board size represents the total number of members serving
on the firm’s corporate board (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999).
Board meetings is the total number of meetings held annually. The
more meetings held by the board, the more information board
members are likely to consider and more involved they appear to be in
the firm’s affairs. However, board meetings may also reflect serious
problems facing the firm requiring frequent meetings. Hence, while it
is an important control, its interpretation is less clear.
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In addition, we control for factors likely to influence CEO
compensation including the proportion of CEO variable pay, average
CEO peer compensation, the gap between CEO pay and that of other
officers of the company, firm performance volatility, and annual
performance. CEO variable pay is measured by calculating the
proportion of noncash contingent pay as a percentage of total
compensation to focus on long-term variable pay. We excluded cash
bonuses because prior research suggests that this form of contingent
pay is less variable over time (Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, GomezMejia, & Welbourne, 2007) and may in fact be used to avoid tax
penalties that accrue when base salary exceeds one million dollars per
annum. Peer pay reflects the pay of peer CEOs in the industry and is
included to capture labor market influences on the focal CEO’s pay
(David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998). Peer pay is calculated as the
average total compensation for CEOs in a three-digit NAICS industry
code excluding the focal CEO. We also controlled for the difference in
pay between the CEO and the next level of executives or what is
termed as pay gap. Pay gap is measured as the percentage difference
in total compensation between the CEO and the second-highest-paid
executive. Performance volatility represents firm risk and as volatility
increases CEOs require an additional risk premium to agree to work for
a riskier firm (cf. Shavell, 1979). This variable is measured as the 60month moving average of stock price volatility (Bekaert, Harvey,
Lundblad, & Siegel, 2007). Firm performance is measured as firm
return on assets and accounts for business cycle effects. Drawing on
prior research we control for CEO age as a proxy for experience
(Cannella & Shen, 2001). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of
firm sales to control for size effects known to explain a large portion of
the variance in CEO pay (Tosi et al., 2000). CEO turnover is a dummy
variable that is coded 1 for years there was a change in the position of
CEO and 0 otherwise. We also include year dummies to account for
time effects.
To limit the effect of extreme outliers, the measures of peer
pay, board meetings, pay gap, performance volatility, board
incentives, and board attendance are winsorized at the 99 percentile
(Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; McNamara, Haleblian, &
Dykes, 2008). We checked the variance inflation factors, and none of
them was larger than 4.71, indicating no multicollinearity issues.
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Finally, with the exception of shareholder returns all independent and
control variables were lagged at period t-1.

Estimation Procedures
The data for our study consists of yearly observations of CEO
and firm variables. Thus, it is a panel data model that prevents us
from using ordinary least squares regression (e.g., Bliese, 2000;
Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008). In addition, our panel
consists of multiple cross-sectional units and very few time periods per
unit. To properly address the specificities of our data, we utilize the
Arellano–Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation
method (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2006). This method
provides several advantages. First, Arellano–Bond provides a very
robust estimation and is preferred for autoregressive-distributed lag
panel data sets with multiple cross-sectional units and few time
periods. Second, while inclusion of a lagged value of the dependent
variable allows us to control for the impact of prior CEO relative
returns on future CEO relative returns, the lagged dependent variable
is likely to be correlated with the error term (Greene, 2000). Such a
problem is avoided in Arellano–Bond GMM estimation. Third, panel
data are often subject to autocorrelation, which is also likely in our
sample (using the Wooldridge test we rejected the null hypothesis of
no serial autocorrelation). Arellano–Bond estimation effectively
addresses such concerns. In addition, Arellano–Bond addresses issues
of heteroscedasticity usually present in panel data sets (Arellano,
2003). Finally, the potential endogeneity of the independent variables
is accounted for by including their lagged values as instruments.
For our sample we relied on Arellano–Bond estimation utilizing
System GMM estimator which increases efficiency and reduces bias
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). In addition, System
GMM is preferable to Difference GMM estimator because “the
persistence of the dependent . . . variable could cause severe weak
instrument problems in Difference GMM models” (Uotila, Maula, Keil, &
Zahra, 2009: 226). We utilize GMM with orthogonal deviations because
our data panel is unbalanced (Alessandri, Tong, & Reuer, 2012;
Arellano & Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2006). In addition, we used a twostep estimator with robust standard errors and a two-lag structure of
the instruments to deal with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
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(e.g., Alessandri et al., 2012; Dokko & Gaba, 2012). Results showed
that the two-lag structure successfully eliminates autocorrelation
problems. We tested the possibility of endogeneity of some of our
variables by including instruments, which represent lagged values of
those variables. Including lagged values of CEO relative returns, pay
gap, tenure, and duality provided consistent results with the ones
reported in the article, which increases the credibility and confidence in
the approach we applied. As a robustness test, we also ran our
analyses with orthogonal deviations and without orthogonal deviations,
with and without robust standard errors, with a two-step and singlestep estimator, with two-, three-, and four-lag structure. Overall,
results are consistent with those reported in the current article.3
In Tables 2 and 4 we report the Hansen statistic and the tests
for autocorrelation. Results indicate that instruments are valid and not
correlated with the error terms (Lim & McCann, 2013; Vandaie &
Zaheer, 2014) and there is no evidence of autocorrelation.
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Results
Before presenting our results for Hypotheses 2 to 4, we would
like to stress that positive (negative) correlation between our
independent variables and our dependent variable indicates that CEOs
are able to capture larger (smaller) share of firm residuals than
shareholders. Tables 1 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and
correlations for the variables in our model.
Table 2 provides results from regressing CEO returns on
shareholder returns and other factors and serves to test Hypothesis 1.
The relationship between shareholder returns and CEO returns has a
parameter value of 1.295 (p < .001), indicating that for every unit
increase in shareholder returns, CEO returns increase an additional
29.5% more than shareholder returns. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is strongly
supported.
Meanwhile, firm size has a positive influence on the size of CEO
returns, while firm performance has a negative influence. This latter
finding provides some support that CEOs are able to partially insulate
their income from shifts in firm performance.
Table 4 provides the results for our Hypotheses 2 to 4. Model 1
of Table 4 includes only the control variables. The majority of our
control variables are not significant, with several exceptions. The
negative association between CEO age and CEO returns indicates that
younger (and probably less wealthy) CEOs are more likely to extract
higher returns from the firm than shareholders. Institutional ownership
is significant suggesting that the presence of large institutional
investors constrains CEOs in capturing larger returns. The positive
association between board independence and CEO relative returns
provides support for the sociopolitical view that board member
economic independence masks social ties to the CEO that can
undermine board efforts to control CEO opportunism (Westphal &
Stern, 2006).
Models 2 to 6 of Table 4 add our primary variables of interest.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that CEO relative returns will decrease as CEO
tenure increases, but that this decrease in relative returns will occur at
a decreasing rate. In support of Hypothesis 2, we find that CEO tenure
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has a negative main effect (p < .001), while tenure squared has a
positive association (p < .001). The convex relationship is presented in
Figure 1. Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive association between CEO
duality and CEO relative returns. The coefficient in Model 4 is
negatively correlated (p < .05) with CEO relative returns indicating
that when a CEO is also the chairperson of the board, she or he
realizes less excessive returns. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that board diligence should constrain CEO
relative returns. Results support this prediction: In particular, we find
a significant negative association (p < .01) between board incentives
and CEO relative returns and a significant negative correlation (p
< .05) between director attendance and CEO relative returns. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 is supported.
Figure 1. Relationship Between CEO Tenure and CEO Relative Returns

Discussion
In this study we have argued and empirically demonstrated that
when enabling conditions exist, CEOs are able to take advantage of
them and capture a larger share of firm residuals than shareholders.
That is, norms of distributive justice that place shareholders front and
center in the allocation of firm residuals are more likely to be violated
when there is evidence of weak procedural justice in corporate
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governance. In particular, CEOs capture higher returns when they
have greater power and those returns are less susceptible to firm
performance fluctuations earlier in their tenure when CEOs’ value to
the firm is likely highest. Conversely, they are able to reduce any loss
of power due to obsolescence of their human capital by developing and
strengthening social ties to board members. Stated in a different way,
under these enabling conditions CEOs are better able to extract
personal gain by decoupling their equity-based returns from those of
shareholders. Thus, despite the push for tying CEO pay to firm
performance through equity forms of compensation, CEOs have
captured an increasing share of firm residuals relative to shareholders
while simultaneously insulating their firm-specific wealth from
fluctuations in firm value. This finding corresponds to the view that
CEOs hold managerial power over boards that set their compensation
and use that power to increase the portion of firm residuals they
extract from the firm (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). That CEOs realize
greater returns than shareholders, who presumably have primacy in
claiming rights to residuals (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001), supports
charges that CEO compensation violates normative views of
distributive justice (Bogle, 2008; Walsh, 2008).
With regard to the role of the board of directors, we encounter a
much more nuanced picture. Though we offered no prediction
concerning full board independence, we find that it exhibits a positive
association with CEO relative returns. In other words, the more
outsiders on the board the more likely CEOs will negotiate for more
income at lower risk. This finding corresponds to arguments that a
focus on the degree of economic independence between board
members and the firm masks social dynamics on the board that are
often invisible to outside observers. In particular, research in the
sociopolitical perspective of corporate governance highlights how top
executives seek to manage the impressions of external constituents
about governance structures, policies, and procedures (Westphal &
Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). An effective way for selfserving CEOs to enhance the legitimacy of high compensation
packages with limited risk is to demonstrate conformity to the
prevailing ideologies or institutional forces by symbolically appointing
more outside directors to the full board who share strong social ties
with them. External constituents and the media, observing formally
independent boards with a high level of structural legitimacy, may
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erroneously assume that such a board will also have higher procedural
legitimacy to effectively control managerial self-interest (Suchman,
1995). Essentially, a greater proportion of outside directors in the full
board might simply represent a smoke screen or a “pretend”
application of the theoretical agency logic of evaluator-evaluated
independence when in fact there may well be collusion or a
communality of interest between the board and CEO, such that CEOs
are able to extract greater share of firm residuals.

Justice Implications
From a normative perspective, the presence of what we are
calling CEO relative returns suggests that the allocation of firm
residuals to CEOs is undeserved and thus represents a violation of
distributive justice as well as an agency cost. Given that CEOs enjoy a
larger share of firm residuals than do shareholders, and this share
corresponds to strong bargaining power of the CEO matched with weak
monitoring by the board, this would seem evidence of CEO rentseeking behavior and a “misappropriation” of shareholder wealth by
the CEO. In other words, greater returns by CEOs vis-à-vis
shareholders may be normatively construed as a manifestation of
agent opportunism resulting in inequitable distributive justice,
assuming that investors are the primary claimants of firm residuals.
While there is no precise a priori point at which the allocation of firm
residuals between CEO and shareholders is determined as optimal, it is
clear that a growing segment of society, including shareholders using
only anecdotal evidence, is questioning the justification of this
allocation from a normative perspective. This study provides empirical
evidence that CEOs are winning at the expense of shareholders. Still,
defenders of compensation practices might argue that there is a
positive motivational value when CEOs capture higher firm residuals
since the size of the pie will be larger for all concerned (the proverbial
“win-win” situation). For instance, the excess returns may offer an
inducement to CEOs to increase effort, make better investment
decisions, improve cost controls and the like which should improve
subsequent firm performance. In a supplementary analysis, we did not
find support for this view. More specifically, for the period 2001 to
2008 we estimated how CEO relative returns relate to future firm
performance. The association was negative but not statistically
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significant suggesting that CEO relative returns do not coincide with
increased firm performance; this finding supports our arguments that
CEO relative returns represent a violation of distributive justice where
CEOs capture a larger share of firm residuals compared to
shareholders.
We argued and found strong support that when directors are
diligent (e.g., attend regularly board meetings and have strong
incentives to monitor CEOs due to their own incentive pay
arrangements), they are more likely to exercise their control function
and thus constrain CEO relative returns. In other words, in addition to
regular board attendance an important condition to secure directors’
effective oversight is to make them partial owners in the firm and tie
part of their compensation to the fortunes of that firm. This suggests a
hierarchy of incentive alignment emerges, such that incentive
alignment between board members and shareholders results in greater
alignment between CEOs and shareholders.
We also found results that are opposite to our theorizing. In
particular, rather than increasing CEO relative returns, duality
decreased the amount of firm residuals captured by CEOs. We believe
that the sociopolitical perspective could explain these findings. A savvy
CEO, knowing the prevailing social norms and expectations for reduced
CEO power, could voluntarily give the appearance of self-sacrificing
power and influence to the board by avoiding the position of CEOchair. While the separation of the CEO and chairman positions helps
gain external legitimacy, a CEO could still leverage her or his social
ties and friendship connections with board members to gain larger
relative returns (e.g., Westphal & Stern, 2006). In other words, abuse
of power would be too obvious for a CEO-chair to receive higher
returns, and hence one way to prevent that inference is to limit those
returns. It might also be the case that boards may appoint CEO-chairs
when the board believes that the CEO will not do things that
compromise the perceived ethicality of the board (for instance, by
securing egregious compensation). This represents an interesting area
for future research.
Finally, our study only focuses on the conditions that allow CEOs
to gain returns from equity-based contingent compensation. This
allowed us to avoid contaminating our measure of CEO returns with
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compensation that is not shared by investors (such as base salary,
other compensation, severance pay, and nonpecuniary forms of
compensation). These forms have been argued to provide the risk
premium that CEOs may demand as their reservation wage to accept
the increased risk bearing that incentive alignment creates. Future
research should consider whether this argument is justified. In
addition, we were unable to capture the behavior of shareholders
directly leaving this as a possible avenue for future research.
Future research may also consider the role of board committees
separately from the full board, such as the compensation committee.
We believe that compensation committees may be in a better position
to constrain CEO opportunism. In particular, because functional board
committees are (a) more subject to direct regulatory institutional
pressures (Scott, 2008), more subject to closer scrutiny by outside
agencies, and bound by strong professional norms and codes of ethics
(such as accredited compensation experts who are members of the
Society for Human Resource Management) and (b) expected to
perform much more focused, explicit, and unambiguous tasks,
generally requiring highly specialized skills; securing social as well as
economic independence of those committees could provide stronger
protection of shareholder interests.

Conclusion
In this study we present a framework that offers new insight
into CEO compensation and returns and which provides an innovative
approach to represent CEO returns as a portion of overall firm
residuals. More specifically, we use shareholder returns as an
appropriate referent for gauging whether CEO returns satisfy one
normative view of distributive justice. We find that CEOs capture a
larger share of firm residuals, which appears to be facilitated by
leverage over the board of directors and factors suggesting that
violations of normative views of distributive justice can be traced to
violations of rules for procedural justice. Thus, the resulting bargaining
between CEOs and boards over CEO pay raises questions about both
distributive and procedural justice issues in negotiating CEO pay.
As a final point, our theoretical arguments and findings are not
meant to imply that the core predictions of agency theory are not
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supported. The reader should be reminded that agency theory has
been criticized in the past for painting a bleak picture of human nature
where selfishness and opportunism, much like the biblical original sin,
are taken as given (Bruce, Buck, & Main, 2005; Davis, Schoorman, &
Donaldson, 1997).4 In this study we take a slightly different angle on
executive compensation and contend that to better understand it we
need to consider the complex interactions and objectives of principals
and agents. While principals strive to better align agent interests with
their own by attempting to align incentives of CEOs to those of
investors, CEOs look for additional compensation to accept such
bargains, while also insulating themselves from the risks associated
with incentive alignment contracts. Our point is that in bargaining over
the allocation of residuals in pursuit of strong pay-performance
sensitivity various facilitating or constraining conditions tilt the balance
of power between principals and agents to capture larger share of firm
residuals, and result in violations of normative views of distributive
justice. That is, we need to look beyond pay-performance sensitivity to
the allocation of residuals and the procedures used in making that
allocation.
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Appendix
Detailed Calculation of CEO Relative Returns
Drawing on Nyberg and colleagues (2010), we calculated both
CEO returns and shareholder returns as ratios. For CEO returns, the
numerator equals the sum of cash bonuses, long-term incentive
payouts, the value realized from the sale of company stock, and
changes in the value of all equity-based components held until the end
of the fiscal year (e.g., stock options, restricted stock, and ownership).
This approach allows us to include the appreciation in value of all
shares not sold during the entire period, the change in intrinsic value
of all exercisable and nonexercisable options held at the beginning of
the period, the value realized from any equity ownership sold during
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the period, and the value realized from exercising options and selling
the resulting stock during the period. The denominator of CEO returns
includes CEO wealth at the beginning of the year (e.g., stock,
restricted stock, vested stock, and stock options).
We excluded salary and “other annual” compensation because
they are not related to performance, generally reflect the reservation
wages paid to CEOs, and are not available to shareholders. Thus, our
measure of CEO returns provides a more conservative test of our
predictions regarding CEO relative returns. In supplemental analyses,
we conducted two robustness tests where we included (a) all
nonvariable forms of CEO pay and (b) only variable forms of CEO pay
in our measure of CEO returns, but we found no change in our
findings.
We calculated CEO returns as CEO income from variable pay
during the year divided by CEO firm-specific wealth at the beginning of
the year,

where CEO variable pay incomet = bonust + LTIPt + change in value of
unexercised unexercisable and exercisable optionst + change in value
of restricted and vested stockt + change in the value of CEO equityt +
value realized from exercised optionst.
CEO beginning value variable pay wealthto = beginning value of
CEO equityto + beginning value of restricted and vested stockto +
beginning value of unexercised unexercisable and exercisable
optionsto.
Shareholder returns are calculated in a similar fashion to CEO
returns by creating a ratio of the change in share price over the period
plus dividends paid during the period, and then divided by the share
price at the beginning of the fiscal year (Yermack, 2006).
CEO returns and shareholder returns were then transformed
through an inverse hyperbolic sine function (HIS):
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sinh – 1(x) = log(x + (x2 + 1)½)
We employed the HIS transformation of our returns measures to
reduce the effect of extreme outliers on our model, and to overcome
issues related to negative values (Burbidge, Magee, & Robb, 1988;
Nyberg et al., 2010).
Notes
1.

Following the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, we conducted a
supplementary test of our hypotheses. In particular, we used CEO returns
as our DV and included shareholder returns as a control variable plus the
rest of the control and independent variables. Results from this approach
are consistent with those we report in this article and are available from
the authors upon request.

2.

Recently, Gove and Junkunc (2013) published a study that examines the
problems with the duality measure. They point out that prior tests
involving duality have produced inconsistent results leading to a debate
over its meaning. As they suggest, the problem with this measure rests
on an assumption of temporal consistency, which they show lacks
empirical validity. Following their recommendations, we conducted a
robustness check with an alternative measurement of duality. In
particular, we identified instances when duality reflected a temporary
event that would not reflect a lasting change in the CEO’s bargaining
power relative to the board. For example, duality is unlikely to give the
CEO lasting bargaining power over the board, if it is created only to assist
in the transition of a CEO to the director position while a successor to the
CEO is hired. Thus, in instances where duality lasted no more than two
periods, we set those observations to zero indicating no duality. This
adjustment to the duality measure produced similar results.

3.

To provide additional robustness checks and comparability with
estimation techniques in prior studies, we also ran our analyses via
generalized least squared estimators with autocorrelation controls
(Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), generalized estimating equations (e.g.,
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), and hierarchical linear modeling. Results
across all these estimation techniques were the same and are available
from the authors.

4.

See Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman, and Johnson-Dykes (2005) for a contrasting
view.
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